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OPINION 
OF THE 
JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT) 
RELA'l'IVE '1'0 'l'HE lUGH'l' OF A 
HUSBAND· TO VOTE ON HIS WIFE'S REAL ESTATE. 
[Given March 30, 1878.] 
To His Excellency Chm·les C. Van Zanclt, Governor of the State of 
Rhode Island and P1·ovidence Plantations. 
We have received from your Excellency a communication request-
ing our opinion upon the following question, to wit: 
" Uan a husband, under the State constitution, Article II, Section 1, be entitled 
to vote by virtue of any right or interest which he may have as husband in the 
real estate of his wife, and if so, under what ci rcumstances ?" 
We think it proper, in giving our answer to this question, to give 
the reasons also on which our answer rests. This will oblige us to go 
back to the doctrines of the common law, which previous to 1844 was 
the law that determined the-right of the husband in the property of 
his wife in this State. 
- . J 
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At common law the husband, simply by force of his marriage, with-
out the birth of issue, acquired an estate in all the wife's real property 
in possession, whether of inheritance, or for the life of the wife, and 
whether vesting in her before or after marriage, during their joint 
lives. The estate thus acquired is commonly denominated an estate 
by marital right. It entitles the husband to the entire usufruct of 
the property during its continuance. It is a freehold, or an estate for 
life, though whether for the life of the husband or of the wife is un-
certain. It may be leased or sold by the husband, or taken on execu-
, 
tion for his debts, unless the law forbids. It is not, however, an in-
dependent estate, for under the old law it was forfeitable for the 
felony of the wife, and the husband is seized of the entire property 
jointly ~ith his wife in her right, and not separately of his marital 
estate in his own right. But this is b~fore issue born. If the 
property of the wife is an estate of inheritance, then, after the birth 
of issue capable of inheriting it, the estate by marital right expands 
into an estate for the life of the husband, and becomes more inde-
pendent and indefeasible. Indeed it has been held that, after the 
birth of issue, the husband becomes solely seized of a freehold estate 
in his own right, and that the interest of the wife is a mere rever-
sionary interest, consequent upon his life estate. But the decisions ' on 
this point are not uniform. The estate after issue born, though not 
forfeitable by the attainder of the wife, may be forfeited by a divorce 
a vinculo for the fault of the husband. The estate is not consum-
mate in the husband until the death of the wife. Before her death 
and after issue born, the husband is denominated tenant by the 
curtesy initiate. 
The question submitted is therefore in effect whether a married 
man, who is qualified by age, residence and citizenship, can vote as 
tenant by marital right, or by curtesy initiate, on the real estate of 
his wife, under the constitution, Art. II, Section 1. _Under that sec-
tion no one has a right to vote unless-to quote the words of the 
section-he is "really and truly possessed in his own right of real 
estate * * * * of the va.lue of one hundred and thirty-fo ur 
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dollars over and above all incumbrances, or which shall rent for seven 
dollars per annum over }1nd above any rent reserved or the interest of 
any incumbrances thereon, being an estate in fee simple, fee-tail, for 
the life of any person, or an estate in reversion or remainder, which 
qualifies no other person to vote." This section is very similar to a 
provision of the election law which was in force when the constitu-
tion was adopted. That law, however, required that the qualifying 
est.:<tte should be "at least an estate for a person's own life." We un-
derstancl that it was the uniform practice nuder that law to permit a 
man to vote on his wife's estate of inheritance, if of sufficient value, 
after the birth of issue capable. of inheriting it. It must therefore 
have been understood that an estate by the curtesy initiate was an 
estate for the husband's own life. The constitution was doubtless 
adopted under that understanding, which we think was entirely cor-
rect. The constitution, as will be seen, is not less liberal in this res-
pect than the election law. We think, therefore, there can be no 
doubt that an estate by curtesy initiate, as it existed at common law, 
may be a sufficient real estate qualification under our constitution, 
Article II, Sec. 1. 
In regard to the estate by· marital right there is more doubt. The-
estate by marital riglrt was clearly not sufficient to qualify under the 
old election law, for under that law the estate was required to be "at 
least an estate for a person's.ow.ILlife."_ In,the.cn.ustitution, inste~d of 
this the requirement is . simply an estate ''for the life of any person." 
The change is significant. It was evidently intended to extend the 
electoral right. It evidently extends it to"the ownero!an estate pur 
autre vie. But if that is all that was intended, the change was of 
trifling importance; for the estate pnr autre vie is of rare occurrence. 
The estate by marital right is an es~ate for the life of one of two per-
sons, that is to say, of the one of them who dies first, and it is there-
fore within the description of an estate "for the life of any person." 
We think it is fair to presume that the question of extending the 
electoral right to tenants by marital right was considered, when those 
words were adopted by the framers of the constitution; and if it was 
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then considered, we can hardly conceive that the words would have 
been adopted, if they were not designed to embrace the ,estate by 
marital right as well as other estates for life. We think, therefore, 
that the estate by marital right, as it existed at common law, may 
also be a sufficient property qualification under Art. II, Sec. 1. 
Perhaps it may be suggested that a mere tenant by marital right 
cannot vote under Art. II, Sec. 1, because that section requires that 
the person claiming to vote shall be "possessed in his own right," 
whereas a tenant by marital right is held to be seized jointly with his 
wife in her 1·ight. The difficulty is, however, merely verbal. The ' 
words "in her right," are used not so much to describe the character 
of the estate as of the seizin or tenure thereof. The words, "in 
his own right," mean that the person claiming to vote shall be en-
titled or hold beneficially for himself, and not simply as trustee or 
custodian. The words are in the old election law, where they could 
not have been intended to exclude an estate by marital right, but 
could only have been used in the sense above indicated. 
Almost immediately after the adoption of the constitution, the 
common law was changed. Dig. of 1844, p. 270. It was enacted 
that "The real estate, chattels real, household furniture, plate, goods, 
stock or shares in the capital stock of any incorporated company of 
this State, or debts secured by mortgage on property within this state, 
which are the property of any woman before maniage, or which may 
become the property of any woman after marriage, shall be -and are 
hereby so far secured to her sole and separate use, that the same and 
the rents, profits and income thereof, shall not be liable to be at-
tached, or in any way taken for the debts of the husband, either be-
fore or after his death; and upon the death of the husband in the 
lifetime of the wife, shall be and 1:emaiJ?. her sole and separate 
property." The act also provides that the receipt or discharge of the 
husband for rents and profits shall be a sufficient receipt -or discharge, 
until notice in writing is given by the wife; after which the receipt or 
discharge of the wife alone shall be sufficient. It still further pro-
vides that nothing in the act shall be construed to impair the rights 
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of the husband upon the death of the wife as tenant by the curtesy. 
The act, by express provision, does not affect any property owned by 
any married woman previous to its enactment. And inasmuch as it 
does not affect her property previously acquired, of course it does not 
affect her husband's right to vote upon her property previously 
acquired. 
Did the act so far modify J.he common law as to affect his right to 
vote upon her property subsequently acquired? The estate by marital 
right is evidently emasculated, and shorn of its strength, but it is not 
utterly abolished. It remains, protected from attachment for the 
husband's debts, to be enjoyed by him until the wife chooses to assert 
her right under the statute to take the rents and profits herself, by 
giving written notice, or by having, as under another section she may 
have, a trustee appointed to hold the property during coverture, un-
less the trust is sooner determined. In ~Mrwtin & Goff vs. Pepull, 6, 
R. I. Rep. 92, it was held by the supreme court of the state, that 
under the act the husband has an estate which can be conveyed to a 
third person who would be entitled to recover and hold possession of 
it until the wife should interfere under the statute. This being so, 
the question is whether the estate, however its value, and especially 
its marketable value, )llay be impaired, is not still a freehold estate. 
We think it is; for it is clear upon authority that to be a freehold 
estate, or estate for life, the estate need not be such that it must neces-
sarily endure for life, if only it is posSible 1lia i may endure so long. 
4 Kent's Com. 26. We think, therefore, that the law of 1844 did not 
in any way affect the right of the husband tn vo.te ,.!ln,llil_L' Atj;icle II, 
Sec. 1, upon the property of his wife, so long as she left him in the 
enjoyment of it. 
The law of 1844;_remained without material change until the Gen-
eral Statutes went into effect Dec. 2, 1872. The General Statutes 
introduced an important modification by enacting that the real 
property of a married woman "shall be absolutely secured to her sole 
and sPparate use," instead of "so far secured to her sole and separate 
use that the same and the rents, profits and income thereof shall not 
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be liable to be attached or in way taken for the debts of the husband ." 
It is true that the old provision that the husband may receive the 
rents and profits until the persons who are held for them are notified 
in writing by the wife not to pay them to him, remains unaltered. 
But this does not authorize ns to conclude that the modification 
is of no effect. It is easy to construe that provision as being simply 
in the nature of a license or permission from the wife, which may be 
presumed until it is expressly repudiated or revoked. But there can 
be no estate by marital right in pl"Operty which is absolutely secured 
to the sole and separate use of the wife. The estate is utterly incom-
patible with so exclusive an appropriation. See Mm·tin & Go.U' vs. 
Pepall, ? R. I. Rep. 94. Nothing remains for the husband which 
he can really call his own. We· think, therefore, that no husband 
who has married since Dec. 2, 1872, or whose wife has acquired the 
property on which he claims the right to vote since Dec. 2, 1872, can 
be entitle~ to vote under Art. II, Sec. 1, simply as tenant by marital 
right. 
The new statute contains no saving in favor of estates by marital 
right acquired previous to its enactment. Can the statute retroact so 
as to destroy an estate by marital right previously acquired, and thus 
disfranchise the tenant? We think not. 'rhe estate previously ac-
quired was a vested estate . and could not be devested by a mere legis-
lative enactment (Cooley's Const. Lim. 360, 361.) We think, there-
fore, that any person who had acquired a right to vote previous to 
Dec. 2, 1872, as tenant by marital right, and, a {o1·tiori, as tenant by 
the curtesy initiate, was not affected in his right by the new 
statute which then went into effect. 
One other question remains to be considered namely: Can a 
husband who has married since Dec. 2, 1872, or whose wife has ac-
quired the property on which he ·claims the right to vote since Dec·. 
2, 1872, be entitled to vote under Art. II. Sec. 1, if he has had issue 
by her capable of inheriting it? The new statute (Gen. St., Ch. 152, 
§14) provides that the right of the husband in the real estate of the 
wife as tenant by the curtesy shall not be impaited. But this cannot 
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mean that this right as tenant by the curtesy initiate shall not be 
impaired, for the absolute appropriation to the use of the wife neces-
sarily excludes that right as well as the mere marital right. It means 
doubtless, t4at tenancy by the curtesy, in its stricter sense, as con-
summate by the death of the wife, shall not be impaired. Does it 
follow from this that the right to vote is lost? We think we are 
bound to uphold the estate, so far as we can consistently with the law, 
and while we think the estate cannot begin in enjoyment during the 
life of the wife, we can see no reason why it may not be held to vest 
during her life, not to be enjoyed until after her death. The vesting is 
not inconsistent with her absolute use. We think, therefore, that the 
estate vests, during the life of the wife, there being iss!le capable of 
inheriting; though its enjoyment must be postponed until the wife 
has deceased. In other words, the statute creates a new kind of 
vested remainder. Will such an estate entitle its owner to vote? We 
see no reason why it may not. Estates in remainder are enumerated 
in Art. II, Sec. 1, among the estates which will qualify their owner to 
vote, if no other person is qualified by the same property, and we can 
see no good reason why a remainder created by statute should not be 
as efficacious as a remainder created by deed or will. To hold that it 
is as efficacious doell not contradict the letter of the constitution, and 
is eminently accordant with its spirit. We think, then, that a hus-
band, married since Dec. 2, 1872, or whose wife has acquired the 
property on which he claimsto vote-since ec. , IB72, may be entitled 
to vote under Art. II, Sec. 1, if he has had issue by her capable of 
inheriting it. 
In conclusion, to answer the question submitted to us briefly, we 
would say: 
1. Any husband who married his wife previous to Dec. 2, 1872, 
ai1d whose wife acquired the property on which he claims the right to 
vote previous to Dec. 2, 1872, is entitled to vote under Art. II, Sec. 
1, if he is otherwise qualified and if the property is a freehold estate 
of the value prescribed in the constitution, whether he has had 
children by his wife or not. 
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2. Any husband married since Dec. 2, 1872, or whose wife has ac-
quired the property on which he claims the right to vote since Dec. 
2, 1872, is entitled to vote under Art. II, Sec. 1, if he is otherwise 
qualified and if the property is an estate of inheritance of the value 
prescribed in the constitution, provided he has had issue by his wife 
capable of inheriting it,-but otherwise, not. 
THOMAS DURFEE, 
W. S. BURGES, 
ELISHA R. POTTER, 
OHARI.,ES MAT'fESON, 
JOHN H. STINESS. 
